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This Article discusses the various statutory provisions, judicial
rules, and ethics provisions that affect judicial disqualification in
Alaska courts.  The Article explains that Alaska judicial
disqualification law is derived from two conflicting doctrines:  one
recognizing that judges have a duty to sit unless there is a concrete
showing of bias, and the other granting parties a broad “right of
disqualification.”  As a result, there are three ways in which
judicial disqualification operates in Alaska.  Disqualification for
cause requires disqualification in cases where tangible evidence of
bias is shown.  Peremptory disqualification allows each party to
disqualify the judge once during the proceeding, provided that the
party acts in good faith.  Finally, various provisions of the Alaska
Code of Judicial Conduct instruct judges to disqualify when
circumstances make them unable to decide the case impartially.
I.  INTRODUCTION
The ability to have every dispute heard by an impartial judge
is essential to our system of jurisprudence.  While judges are
people with all the attendant human imperfections and limitations,
they are also selected and trained to put aside many of their
inherent predispositions to ensure an impartial decision.  Of
course, the perception by others of a given judge’s impartiality in a
matter is also of concern.  To address the many complex issues
involved in assessing and ensuring a trial by a judge free of bias, the
law has historically allowed parties to move to disqualify judges.  In
Alaska, judicial disqualification law takes essentially three different
forms:  disqualification for cause under Alaska Statutes section
22.20.020; peremptory disqualification under Alaska Statutes
section 22.20.022 and corresponding Criminal Rule 25(d) and Civil
Rule 42(c); and the judicial ethics requirements set out in the
Copyright © 2000 by Marla N. Greenstein.  This Article is also available on the
World Wide Web at http://www.duke.edu/journals/17ALRGreenstein.
* Executive Director, Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct; A.B.,
American Government and Philosophy, Georgetown University; J.D., Loyola
University of Chicago School of Law.
GREENSTEIN.FINAL.FMT.DOC 05/01/00  11:11 AM
54 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [17:1
Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct.  This Article looks at the
development of each of these approaches to judicial
disqualification in Alaska and their inter-relationship.
II.  HISTORY
Modern doctrines of judicial disqualification can be traced
back to ancient civil law and early British common law.  Civil law
countries incorporated broad concepts of judicial bias into their
codes.1  By contrast, the British common law required judicial
disqualification where the judge was shown to have a financial
interest in a proceeding but not where there was a mere suspicion
of bias.  Historically, then, there has always been a tension between
those court doctrines allowing broad rights of disqualification
based on amorphous assertions of bias and those requiring some
tangible and substantial showing of interest.
The conflicting ancient doctrines of judicial disqualification
“for cause” and a “peremptive right” to disqualify now coexist in
many American jurisdictions, including Alaska.  Peremptory
disqualification has evolved to address those situations where a
party believes, but cannot prove, that a judge is biased.  The
doctrine of peremptory disqualification, which allows
disqualification without a showing of bias or incompetency, has
been adopted mostly in the midwestern and western states.2  In
Alaska, both concepts existed from statehood and have their roots
in a 1940 statute similar to concurrent federal law.3
In 1972, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) adopted a
Code of Judicial Conduct that includes detailed criteria for judicial
disqualification.4  The ABA Code, which was the first detailed code
of ethics for judges, attempted to codify the existing case law
regarding disqualification issues.  Alaska adopted the ABA Code
by supreme court order in 19735 and subsequently revised its code
in 1998.6  Paralleling, to a large extent, the “for cause” criteria set
out in the statute, the 1973 Code added an affirmative duty on the
part of the judge to disqualify in any proceeding where the judge’s
1. See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 1.2.2 (1996).
2. See id. § 3.1.
3. See Robert Arthur Levinson, Peremptory Challenges of Judges in the
Alaska Courts, 6 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 269, 272-73 (1977) (not addressing “for
cause” disqualification).
4. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C (1972).
5. See Alaska Sup. Ct. Order No. 170 (1973).
6. See Alaska Sup. Ct. Order No. 1322 (1998).
GREENSTEIN.FINAL.FMT.DOC 05/01/00  11:11 AM
2000] ALASKA JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION 55
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”7  While used chiefly
as a tool to guide judicial conduct and, as discussed below, a
judicial conduct enforcement mechanism, the Code provisions have
also been cited by Alaska courts to illustrate their application of
the disqualification statutes and rules.8
III.  DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES FOR CAUSE
A. The Statute
The most comprehensive codified law governing the
disqualification of Alaska judges is also the least used by litigants.
Section 22.20.020 of the Alaska Statutes outlines criteria that
require a judge to disqualify him or herself in a matter.9  There is
also a subjective catchall provision that requires a judge to recuse
him or herself if the judge “feels that, for any reason, a fair and
impartial decision cannot be given.”10
Section 22.20.020 provides a ready checklist for judges to
determine whether they should remove themselves from any given
case.  If a judge recuses on his or her own motion, the statute
provides that the case be immediately transferred by the district’s
presiding judge.11  Once a judge presents potential conflicts that
qualify under the enumerated provisions of section 22.20.020(a),
the parties may choose to waive their rights to judicial
disqualification, provided the conflict arises under a waivable
provision pursuant to section 22.20.020(b).12  The judge is under a
duty to disclose the reasons for disqualification and those grounds
are deemed waived “unless a party raises an objection.”13  The
statute is structured so that actual bias on the part of a judge and
those circumstances that give rise to a strong inference of bias are
generally not waivable.14
7. ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1) (1973).
8. See, e.g., Amidon v. State, 604 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1979).
9. See ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.020 (LEXIS 1999).  These criteria are listed in
Part III.C, infra.
10. Id.  § 22.20.020(a)(9).
11. See id. § 22.20.020(c).
12. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
13. ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.020(b).  But see ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3F (LEXIS 1999) (restricting a judge’s participation in
discussions concerning waiver and requiring the judge to notify the parties of the
effect of a failure to act).
14. Examples of circumstances giving rise to a strong inference of bias are
where the judge is a party, a material witness, or has a direct financial interest in
the matter.  See ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.020(b) (LEXIS 1999).
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When a judge denies a motion to disqualify for cause, the
statute requires another judge to determine anew the question of
disqualification.15  This provision seeks to provide a check on
judges who wrongly determine their own ability to hear cases
objectively when their impartiality is questioned.  However, the
efficacy of the practice is questionable.  No Alaska appellate cases
cite to hearings where a judge has ordered the disqualification of
another judge pursuant to a motion under the statute, but many
cases have denied motions to disqualify.16  This disparity could
merely be a function of the nature of appeals, in that granted
motions of this kind would seldom, if ever, give rise to an appeal.
It is equally likely, however, that judges are reluctant to overturn a
colleague’s assessment of impartiality.
When a district court judge denies disqualification, the
presiding judge of the district assigns another judge to review the
district court judge’s determination.17  When a superior court judge
denies disqualification, the supreme court makes the assignment.18
The court of appeals has held that when a party moves to disqualify
all district court judges, it is not a violation of section 22.20.020(c)
for the presiding judge to assign the matter to himself for decision.19
It is up to the party seeking disqualification to pursue any rights
under section 22.20.020(c), at least where the party alleges general
bias.20  Motions for blanket disqualification of all judges of a certain
court cannot be reviewed under the statute without allowing each
individual judge to determine his or her own ability to sit on the
matter.21
B. A Judge’s Duty to Sit
Judges under early common law and federal law had a strong
duty to sit on cases where there was not a sufficient showing under
relevant rules for disqualification.22  As a result, judges had an
affirmative obligation to hear cases unless a disqualifying factor
could be proved.23  As the law evolved to include general bias and
15. See id. § 22.20.020(c).
16. See, e.g., Wasserman v. Bartholomew, 923 P.2d 806, 815-16 (Alaska 1996);
Neal & Co. v. City of Dillingham, 923 P.2d 89, 92 (Alaska 1996).
17. See ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.020(c).
18. See id.
19. See Feichtinger v. State, 779 P.2d 344, 346-48 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
20. See Amidon v. State, 604 P.2d 575, 577 (Alaska 1979); Coffey v. State, 585
P.2d 514, 525 (Alaska 1978).
21. See Feichtinger, 779 P.2d at 348.
22. See FLAMM, supra note 1, §§ 20.10.1, 20.10.4.
23. See id. § 20.10.2.
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appearance of bias as bases for disqualification, several
jurisdictions recognized that the duty to sit no longer had a clear
meaning and abolished the rule.24  Those courts that have abolished
the duty nonetheless recognize that “a judge should ordinarily not
recuse himself merely in order to avoid embarrassment or
uneasiness or because he would prefer to be trying some other type
of case.”25
Alaska case law has explicitly retained the common law “duty
to sit” rule.  In Amidon v. State,26 the Alaska Supreme Court noted
that “a judge has as great an obligation not to disqualify himself,
when there is no occasion to do so, as he has to do so in the
presence of valid reasons.”27  This concept was reaffirmed in
Feichtinger v. State,28 where a blanket challenge to recuse all sitting
district court judges led the court of appeals to state that “the
public is entitled to have sitting district court judges decide cases
assigned to them in the absence of good cause for recusal.”29  The
Alaska courts have implied that judicial responsibility to the public
requires that judges hear even those cases that may cause them
some discomfort.  Consequently, where there is a mere assertion of
an appearance of bias, judges must face a difficult balancing of
their conflicting duties.  While “judges must avoid the appearance
of bias, it is equally important to avoid the appearance of shirking
responsibility.”30
C. Bias
Alaska Statutes section 22.20.020 identifies specific situations
that require disqualification:
(a) A judicial officer may not act in a matter in which
(1) the judicial officer is a party;
(2) the judicial officer is related to a party or a party’s
attorney by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree;
(3) the judicial officer is a material witness;
(4) the judicial officer or the spouse of the judicial officer,
individually or as a fiduciary, or a child of the judicial officer
has a direct financial interest in the matter;
(5) a party, except the state or a municipality of the state,
has retained or been professionally counseled by the judicial
24. See id. § 20.10.4.
25. Id. § 20.10.2.
26. 604 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1979).
27. Id. at 577.
28 779 P.2d 344 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
29. Id. at 348.
30. Id.
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officer as its attorney within two years preceding the
assignment of the judicial officer to the matter;
(6) the judicial officer has represented a person as attorney
for the person against a party, except the state or a
municipality of the state, in a matter within two years
preceding the assignment of the judicial officer to the
matter;
(7) an attorney for a party has represented the judicial
officer or a person against the judicial officer, either in the
judicial officer’s public or private capacity, in a matter
within two years preceding the filing of the action;
(8) the law firm with which the judicial officer was
associated in the practice of law within the two years
preceding the filing of the action has been retained or has
professionally counseled either party with respect to the
matter;
(9) the judicial officer feels that, for any reason, a fair and
impartial decision cannot be given.
(b) A judicial officer shall disclose, on the record, a reason for
disqualification specified in (a) of this section at the
commencement of a matter in which the judicial officer
participates.  The disqualifications specified in (a)(2), (a)(5),
(a)(6), (a)(7), and (a)(8) of this section may be waived by the
parties and are waived unless a party raises an objection.31
Each situation listed above gives rise to an inference of bias.  While
actual bias is difficult to prove, the statute, by enumerating certain
circumstances, sets out guideposts for determining bias.  Courts are
generally reluctant to impose a finding of bias where the judge has
neither disclosed a bias nor made a tangible showing that he or she
cannot be impartial in the case.  In Nelson v. Fitzgerald,32 the
Alaska Supreme Court found that section 22.20.020 disqualified a
judge who had previously disqualified himself from hearing any
matter involving an attorney against whom he held a personal
bias.33  The trial judge admitted the bias by filing a certification of
bias, but did not disqualify himself from the case in question even
though it fell during the time covered by the certification of bias.34
Generally, information or “biases” that judges acquire through
hearing other cases are not legitimate bases for disqualification.35
This rule is especially important in Alaska’s small legal community,
where there are many communities that have access to only one
judge.
31. ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.020(a) (LEXIS 1999).
32. 403 P.2d 677 (Alaska 1965).
33. See id. at 679.
34. See id. at 678.
35. See FLAMM, supra note 1, §§ 12.3-12.6.
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In Alaska Trams Corp. v. Alaska Electric Light & Power,36 the
Alaska Supreme Court held that it was not unreasonable to refuse
disqualification of a judge who may have made sarcastic comments
and participated in environmental movements.37  A party
unsuccessfully challenged the trial judge for perceived unfair
treatment, the judge’s past participation in environmental causes,
unspecified allegations of sarcastic statements made in another
proceeding, and a comment made in an opinion denying the party’s
motion for a preliminary injunction.38  The court allowed the judge
to hear the case because “[a] review of the record as a whole
fail[ed] to reveal any unfairness in the conduct of the trial and the
alleged instances of bias, considered either collectively or
individually, fail[ed] to demonstrate any specific bias or generalized
pattern of bias.”39
Other cases show that judges will normally not be disqualified
unless the allegations of bias can be specifically connected to the
current case.  In DeNardo v. Michalski,40 the supreme court held
that disqualification was not required where a judge had previously
headed the state office of prosecutions that had handled the
current defendant’s appeals in prior cases.41  The court found no
indication that the judge, while an attorney, participated in any
aspect of the current case.42  In Long v. Long,43 the supreme court
also rejected a challenge to the impartiality of a trial court judge in
a child custody dispute where a witness in the case had briefly
investigated the judge.44  The court noted that the trial judge was
not even aware at the time of the hearing that he had been the
subject of an investigation, nor was there any showing of unfair
treatment.45  In Capital Information Group v. State,46 the supreme
court refused to disqualify a judge because he had written an
advisory memo on a related matter fifteen years earlier.47  The
court noted that the judge had no personal knowledge of the
disputed facts in the matter before him.48
36. 743 P.2d 350 (Alaska 1987).
37. See id. at 353.
38. See id. at 352.
39. Id. at 353.
40. 811 P.2d 315 (Alaska 1991).
41. See id. at 316.
42. See id.
43. 816 P.2d 145 (Alaska 1991).
44. See id. at 155.
45. See id. at 155-56.
46. 923 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1996).
47. See id. at 40-41.
48. See id. at 41.
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The Alaska Court of Appeals reached a different result in
Perotti v. State,49 where a trial judge heard evidence in a juvenile
waiver proceeding that was later determined to violate the
defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination in an unrelated
criminal appeal heard by the same judge.  The juvenile waiver
proceedings were assigned to the judge, who ordered Perotti over
his objection to submit to a psychiatric evaluation.50  The
psychiatric reports were considered at the waiver hearing, and the
judge ordered waiver out of juvenile jurisdiction, allowing Perotti
to be tried as an adult.51  The waiver order included references to
the professional evaluation as it related to rehabilitative
prospects.52  Shortly after that, the court of appeals ruled that court-
ordered evaluations in juvenile waiver cases violate the privilege
against self-incrimination.53  The same judge, in taking Perotti’s no
contest plea, offered a different judge for sentencing and scheduled
a status hearing to allow the defendant to decide whether he
wanted a different judge.54  The defendant requested another judge
at the status hearing, and the case was reassigned.55  The State then
moved to vacate the reassignment, characterizing it as an
additional peremptory challenge, rather than one for cause.56
Perotti filed a formal motion for disqualification based on the
reliance on improper evidence and an appearance of partiality.57  In
denying the motion, the judge explicitly stated, “[t]his court finds
[the judge] can be fair to the defendant with respect to this case.”58
The judge assigned to review the motion for disqualification ruled
that the judge would be able to distinguish the inadmissible
evidence at the sentencing.59  The court of appeals ruled that the
judge indeed should have been disqualified, noting that the judge’s
initial offer to recuse himself “certainly enhanced the appearance
of partiality.”60
The holding in Perotti was strictly limited to the particulars of
the case.  The court made special note of the similarity of issues
49. 806 P.2d 325 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
50. See id. at 326.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See R.H. v. State, 777 P.2d 204 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
54. See Perotti, 806 P.2d at 326.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 326-27.
57. See id. at 327.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 329.
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involved in juvenile waiver proceedings and subsequent criminal
prosecutions.  Citing relevant juvenile justice standards that relate
to juvenile waivers, the court endorsed an approach that allowed a
juvenile to disqualify the judge in the juvenile proceeding from
presiding at subsequent adjudication.61  The juvenile justice
standards note that, under these circumstances, “the likelihood that
the juvenile will perceive impropriety is great.”62  The court
reasoned that where a judge presided over both the criminal case
and its prior juvenile waiver proceeding based on the same
conduct, “fair-minded persons apprised of the objective facts would
conclude that [the judge’s] participation in the sentencing hearing
created an appearance of partiality.”63
Can we then conclude that criminal due process creates a
lower threshold for disqualification based on an appearance of
partiality than that for civil cases?  A look at the peremptory
challenge cases in Alaska provides some guidance.
IV.  PEREMPTORY DISQUALIFICATION
A. The Governing Provisions
Peremptory disqualification or disqualification as a matter of
right was initially created by statute,64 and has subsequently been
given procedural structure and meaning by court rule in Criminal
Rule 25(d)65 and Civil Rule 42(c).66  Alaska Statutes section
22.20.022(a) is based on a subjective belief on the part of a party or
party’s attorney that “a fair and impartial trial cannot be
obtained.”67  The statute requires an affidavit alleging that belief
and containing a statement that it is made “in good faith and not
for the purpose of delay.”68  It also gives a five-day window for the
filing and allows only one filing per action.  These procedures are
largely superseded by the corresponding court rules.
61. See id.
62. Id. (quoting Standards Relating to Transfer Between Courts § 2.3J
(Approved Draft 1980)).
63. Id. at 330.
64. See ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.022 (LEXIS 1999).
65. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 25(d)(2).
66. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 42(c).  For a more detailed examination of peremptory
challenges in the first 20 years of the state, see generally Levinson, supra note 3,
but note its limitations in not addressing the many approaches to addressing bias
that exist under § 22.20.020 disqualification for cause.
67. ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.022(a).
68. Id.
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Criminal Rule 25(d) replaces the affidavit requirement with a
“Notice of Change of Judge” that must be signed by counsel.69  The
notice shall neither “specify grounds nor be accompanied by an
affidavit.”70  The rule reasserts the five-day definition of timeliness
for the filing and addresses the issue of the number of peremptory
challenges allowed when there are multiple defendants.71  Finally,
the rule articulates that a waiver takes place when, after an
opportunity to consult with an attorney, the party either
participates in an omnibus hearing or any subsequent hearing.72
Civil Rule 42(c) parallels the criminal rule in many respects.  It
too requires a “Notice of Change of Judge” and explicitly states
that grounds should not be specified.73  The same five-day
timeliness standard applies, and waiver is accomplished by
“knowingly participating before that judge in:  (i) Any judicial
proceeding which concerns the merits of the action and involves
the consideration of evidence or of affidavits; or (ii) A pretrial
conference; or (iii) The commencement of trial; or (iv) If the
parties agree upon a judge. . . .”74
The validity of the rules, to the extent that they alter some of
the particular requirements of the statute, was addressed in Gieffels
v. State.75  In Gieffels, the court recognized the constitutional bases
for judicial rulemaking and stated that it has “consistently affirmed
[the court’s] power to regulate procedural and administrative
matters in Alaska courts.”76  The court noted that section 22.20.022
encompassed both substantive and procedural matters.77
Substantive matters are properly determined by the legislature, but
the courts properly determine the procedures that are followed to
accomplish the substantive purposes of the statutes.78  In this
instance:
Although the legislature has the power to create the right to a
fair trial before an unbiased judge, and the right to pre-empt a
judge without requiring actual proof of bias or interest, it has
very limited power to provide for the means by which that pre-
emption right may be exercised. . . .Therefore, insofar as Rule
25(d) regulates only the procedural aspects of the peremptory
69. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 25(d)(2).
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 25(d)(5).
73. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 42(c)(1).
74. Id. at 42(c)(4).
75. 552 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1976).
76. Id. at 667.
77. See id.
78. See id.
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right created by AS 22.20.022, and to the extent that the rule
does not infringe upon the substantive right created by statute,
the provisions of Rule 25(d) supersede the legislative
enactment.79
In the course of applying the criminal rule to the facts of the case,
the court addressed the substantive purposes of the statute and
examined whether the taking of a plea and setting bail was
meaningfully affected by a biased judge.80  The court distinguished
“guilty” pleas from “not guilty” pleas, recognizing that acceptance
of a guilty plea involves little, if any, discretion and there is “no
possibility of bias that would interfere with the subsequent ability
of a defendant to receive a fair disposition of his case.”81  There is,
however, the obligation of the judge to inform the defendant of his
right to a peremptory challenge if he has waived counsel.82
Similarly, setting bail generally does not affect the final disposition
of a case and it is acceptable to allow a pre-empted judge to
preside.83  If the amount of bail or conditions are in dispute, the
court states that the matter “should be immediately referred to
another judicial officer.”84  As with guilty pleas, the defendant
should be advised of the right to have bail heard by another judge.85
The substantive versus procedural distinction was later applied
in Main v. State,86 which involved a dispute over compliance with
the five-day time period.87  In determining whether a defendant had
waived his right to perempt a re-assigned judge, the court of
appeals stated as follows:
[T]he five-day time period established in AS 22.20.022(c) is a
procedural component of the statutory right to peremptory
challenge of a judge created by AS 22.20.022(a).  The basic
purpose of the legislation is to enable litigants to challenge a
judge assigned to their case without making a showing of actual
bias. . . .Nothing in the language of the statute or in its legislative
history indicates that the legislature intended to elevate the five-
day period for exercise of a peremptory challenge to the stature
of a substantive right.88
79. Id.
80. See id. at 668.
81. Id. at 669.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 670.
85. See id.
86. 668 P.2d 868 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
87. See id. at 869-70.
88. Id. at 872.
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The criminal rule’s waiver provision superseded any conflicting
statutory time period.89
A similar question was raised in the civil context in Schmid v.
Miller,90 where the supreme court did not find any conflict between
the civil rule and the statute.91  Instead, citing both statute and civil
rule, the court found that the notice of change of judge was timely
filed and was not waived by a hearing on a temporary restraining
order where no evidence was considered.92
To summarize, while there may be differences between the
court rules and the statute governing peremptory challenge of a
judge, court decisions have applied the rules to clearly procedural
disputes and have looked to the statute to interpret any substantive
applications.93  The general substantive purpose of the statute is to
allow a challenge for bias without having to articulate any basis for
that belief.94  As will be seen, the lines may often blur between the
substantive purpose of peremptory challenge of judge and
disqualification for cause in section 22.20.020.
B. Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Cases
Perhaps the most striking element of the peremptory
challenge in Alaska is its substantive component.  Peremptory
challenges, though largely a matter of procedure, convey a right to
challenge a judge without articulating any basis for that challenge.95
While it is often referred to as a “change of judge as a matter of
right,”96 it is the word “right” that conveys substantive meaning.  In
the area of criminal law, that right takes many forms and is also
limited in many ways.
One interesting possibility is that peremptory challenges can
be used to select particular judges where there are single judge
locations.  The supreme court addressed that possibility in Padie v.
State,97 where both parties stipulated to enter a guilty plea before
the sole judge in Kodiak, claiming that the effect of publicity from
the first trial in Anchorage entitled them to the change of judge.98
89. See Tunley v. Municipality of Anchorage Sch. Dist., 631 P.2d 67, 71 n.3
(Alaska 1981) (citing Gieffels v. State, 552 P.2d 661, 667-68 (Alaska 1976)).
90. 619 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1980).
91. See id. at 1.
92. See id. at 2.
93. See Tunley, 631 P.2d at 71 n.3.
94. See id. at 71 (citing Gieffels, 552 P.2d at 671).
95. See id. at 71 n.2.
96. Main v. State, 668 P.2d 868, 870 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
97. 566 P.2d 1024 (Alaska 1977).
98. See id. at 1025-26.
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When the Anchorage trial judge did not honor the stipulation, the
defense objected, arguing that they were entitled to the change as a
matter of right.99  Relying on the last line of the waiver provision in
Criminal Rule 25(d)(5), which states that “[n]o provision of this
rule shall bar a stipulation as to the judge before whom a plea of
guilty or of nolo contendere shall be taken under Rule 11,”100 the
parties asserted that they were permitted effectively to “pre-empt
all the [j]udges within the Judicial District except the [j]udge before
whom the plea shall be taken under Rule 11.”101  The court
disagreed with this interpretation and, referring to the assignment
discretion of the presiding judge, interpreted the provision as
preventing even a perempted judge from participating in a limited
way by entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere on the basis of
a stipulation.102  According to the court, the statute explicitly
recognized the need to have a prompt acceptance of a plea “in
order to avoid the delay and expense of going to another city or
bringing another judge to the city wherein the defendant is located
for entry of the plea.”103  The court very firmly stated that the “right
to disqualify a judge, and the right to thereafter partially waive
such disqualification to allow him to accept a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, does not add up to a right to dictate where and before
whom a defendant’s plea will be entered.”104
What qualifies as a waiver is another frequent issue in criminal
peremptory challenge cases.  As noted above, bail hearings are
neither clearly ministerial (and therefore not constituting waiver)
nor an exercise of judicial discretion (in which case participation
would constitute a waiver).105  The court of appeals attempted to
clarify this issue as applied to a contested bail hearing in Gardner v.
State.106  Reading the rule closely and noting the specific sequence
of hearings enumerated in that rule, the court found that a bail
hearing held shortly after arraignment and well before an omnibus
hearing date was not “any subsequent pretrial hearing”
constituting a waiver under the rule.107
Because a failure to exercise the right to perempt the judge
results in the party forfeiting rights under Criminal Rule 25(d), the
99. See id. at 1026.
100. Id. at 1027.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 1027-28.
103. Id. at 1028.
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
106. 702 P.2d 250 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
107. Id. at 251 (citing ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 25(d)(5)).
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defendant must have “reasonable access to counsel before the
commencement of trial if the failure to file a timely peremptory
challenge is to work a forfeiture.”108  Where there is defense
counsel prior to trial, “it will be conclusively presumed that
reasonable access existed and, questions of ineffective assistance of
counsel aside, failure to exercise a peremptory challenge prior to
selection of the jury forfeits any rights defendant and his counsel
might otherwise have had under Criminal Rule 25(d).”109  Similarly,
it has been held that probation revocation proceedings are the
same case as the original sentencing for purposes of peremptory
challenge as “justice is best served if the same judge who originally
sentenced the defendant makes the sentencing decision at any
subsequent probation revocation proceedings.”110  In other words,
participation in a sentencing hearing is a waiver under the rule that
applies to all subsequent probation revocation proceedings.111
Criminal Rule 25(d)(1) allows the trial judge to give
uncooperative multiple defendants more than one change of
judge.112  In Moore v. State,113 one defendant exercised his
peremptory challenge, and the co-defendants were not happy with
the resulting appointment.114  The court held that it was within the
judge’s discretion whether to grant additional challenges and that
no co-defendant could veto a challenge made by another co-
defendant.115  Noting that the primary purpose of the rule and
statute is “to allow a party to disqualify a biased judge,”116 the court
of appeals found that it “is not unfair to allow a single defendant in
a multiple-party case to unilaterally exercise a peremptory
challenge.”117  Citing Padie v. State, the court reaffirmed that
litigants have no right to insist that a particular judge hear their
case.118  To give guidance to judges in their exercise of discretion in
these circumstances, the court noted that the competing interests
must be evaluated:
A defendant may have articulable reasons to distrust the
impartiality of the second assigned judge, even though these
108. Trudeau v. State, 714 P.2d 362, 366 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
109. Id.
110. McRae v. State, 909 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
111. Cf. Wallace v. State, 829 P.2d 1208 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
probation revocation proceeding is governed by civil peremption rule).
112. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 25(d)(1).
113. 895 P.2d 507 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
114. See id. at 509.
115. See id. at 511-12.
116. Id. at 511.
117. Id.
118. See id. (citing Padie v. State, 566 P.2d 1024, 1027-28 (Alaska 1977)).
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reasons may not be sufficient to support a challenge for cause.
On the other hand, Criminal Rule 25(d), by restricting each side
to one peremptory challenge in normal circumstances, implicitly
recognizes that the number of peremptory challenges must be
limited if the court system is to function effectively.119
The court has also expressly allowed trial judges to “reject a
request for additional peremptory challenges when it appears that
a party’s request is based on considerations of prospective strategic
advantage rather than the party’s fear of the second judge’s
potential bias or partiality.”120  Once again, the court reaffirmed
that the underlying purpose of peremptory challenges is to protect
parties from anticipated judicial bias.
C. Peremptory Challenges in Civil Cases
Like its criminal counterpart, Civil Rule 42(c) has given rise to
case law that recognizes the essential substantive right that the
statute confers.  The case law consistently refers to the “right” to
perempt a judge and often focuses on when a knowing waiver of
that right has taken place.  Remands in civil cases, as in criminal
cases, do not give an additional peremptory challenge where there
is no reassignment. The courts have noted that “it would be fair to
presume that the same judge would preside at the second trial in
the absence of a reassignment of the case to another judge.”121
Retrials are not new proceedings.122  Where litigants knowingly
participate in a proceeding concerning the merits of the
controversy, they have waived any right to a peremptory
challenge.123  Allowing peremptory challenges on remand would
allow litigants to challenge a judge “merely because his rulings in
the original trial were not as favorable” as desired,124 subverting the
purpose of the waiver provision that “concerns the merits of the
action and involves the consideration of evidence or of
affidavits.”125
However, when a litigant refiles a complaint that was
previously dismissed, that litigant is not bound to any challenges he
may have exercised in the prior action.126  In Staso v. State
Department of Transportation, the plaintiff sought to disqualify the
119. Id. at 512.
120. Id.
121. Priest v. Lindig, 591 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Alaska 1979).
122. See Sebring v. Colver, 649 P.2d 932, 935 (Alaska 1982).
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 42(c)(4)(i).
126. See Staso v. State Dep’t of Transp., 895 P.2d 988, 994 (Alaska 1995).
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judge assigned to his refiled case.127  Citing the court of appeals
holding that a second peremptory challenge is not allowed in a
proceeding that is ancillary to or a continuation of the underlying
matter, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a refiled suit is a new
action that, in turn, creates a new right to a peremptory
challenge.128  The court distinguished refiled actions from collateral
matters, which would be considered the same action for
peremptory challenge purposes, “drawing a bright-line where a
refiled case is given a new docket number, new filing fees are
imposed, and new process is served.”129
Waiver does not occur merely by participating in a hearing on
a consolidation motion.  The waiver, to be a knowing waiver, can
occur only after the case has been assigned to a specific judge.130
Additionally, participation in various pretrial matters before a
judge is permanently assigned does not waive an otherwise timely
peremptory challenge.131  For example, appearing on a motion for a
temporary restraining order where there was no evidence
presented does not constitute a waiver.132  However, filing a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does constitute a waiver, at least in a
single-judge court site.133  In Kodiak Island Borough v. Large, the
Alaska Supreme Court held that because a 12(b)(6) motion
concerns the merits of a case, it triggers a case assignment.134
Acknowledging that the waiver must also be knowing, the court
noted that in a single-judge site, the parties knew that the local
judge
would be the trial judge unless he was disqualified.  To hold
otherwise would create a situation which is susceptible to the
practice of “judge shopping,” where a party could take
advantage of the clerk’s tardiness in formally giving notification
by sampling the judge’s rulings on motions presented before that
time, and then availing itself of the right to peremptorily
challenge the judge if the rulings are not to its liking.135
Like the criminal rule, Civil Rule 42(c) addresses concerns
that arise in multiple-party cases.  Alaska Civil Rule 42(c) provides,
in part, that
127. See id. at 989.
128. See id. at 991.
129. Id. at 992.
130. See Tunley v. Municipality of Anchorage Sch. Dist., 631 P.2d 67, 73
(Alaska 1980).
131. See Smith v. State, 616 P.2d 863, 865 (Alaska 1980).
132. See Schmid v. Miller, 619 P.2d 1, 2 (Alaska 1980).
133. See Kodiak Island Borough v. Large, 622 P.2d 440, 443 (Alaska 1981).
134. See id.
135. Id. at 444.
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[t]wo or more parties aligned on the same side of an action,
whether or not consolidated, shall be treated as one side for
purposes of the right to a change of judge, but the presiding
judge may allow an additional change of judge to a party whose
interests in the action are hostile or adverse to the interests of
another party on the same side.136
A beneficiary to a trust has been held to be entitled to a
peremptory challenge even though technically the beneficiary was
not a party.137  The court found that the beneficiary was “a full
participant in the proceedings, whose interest in the trust is the
focus of the current litigation.”138  An intervenor late in a
proceeding also has a right to change a judge peremptorily.139  In
Mundt v. Northwest Explorations, Inc.,140 the Alaska Supreme
Court found that when the intervenor’s interests are not
coextensive with those of a prior party to the matter, the
intervening party has an independent right to challenge the judge.141
The intervenor’s right to change judges does not depend on the
stage of litigation and may even occur in the post-judgment stage.142
The court hinted that any fears that the new judge will reopen
already decided issues can be addressed if the concerned party
simply points them out to the new judge.143  Looking to the
underlying purpose of peremptory disqualification, the court notes
that the intervenor who meets the requirements of the rule has the
right to peremptorily challenge the judge, and “the right is just that
– a right, not an interest subject to balancing.”144
D. Determining Whether a Peremptory Challenge is Civil or
Criminal
Although it is usually clear whether a situation falls under the
criminal peremption rule or the civil one, sometimes that is not the
case.  For example, the court of appeals has interpreted probation
revocation proceedings to be civil proceedings for purposes of
appeal,145 but in another case held that such proceedings “are
viewed as the ‘same case’ [as the criminal sentencing] for
136. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 42(c)(1).
137. See Barber v. Barber, 915 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Alaska 1996).
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. 963 P.2d 265 (Alaska 1998).
141. See id. at 268.
142. See id. at 269.
143. See id. at 270.
144. Id.
145. See Wallace v. State, 829 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
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peremptory challenge purposes.”146  Both contempt proceedings
(criminal or civil) and civil sanctions that arise out of other
underlying court proceedings are ancillary to those underlying
proceedings, and thus do not give rise to independent peremptory
challenge rights.147  How post-conviction relief petitions should be
treated remains unclear.  In many ways, they are the civil
counterpart to the criminal case in the same way that probation
revocation proceedings are.  However, while probation revocation
proceedings are directly related to the continuing validity of the
sentencing, post-conviction relief petitions often challenge the
various bases of the underlying criminal proceedings.  In other
words, a judge in a probation revocation proceeding will enforce
the sentencing decision while a judge in a post-conviction relief
petition may be asked to assess the criminal trial court’s
determination critically.148
E. The Relationship of Peremptory Challenges to Challenges
“For Cause”
While there are few cases that directly address the relationship
of the peremptory disqualification right with disqualification for
cause, there are some assumptions that can be derived from the
cases available.  For instance, a denial of a challenge for cause does
not force the losing litigant to forfeit his or her otherwise available
right to exercise a peremptory challenge for that same judge.149
However, filing a motion to disqualify a judge for cause will not toll
the general five-day timeliness standard for exercising that
peremptory challenge.150  Therefore, if a litigant truly believes that
the judge has a bias or is in a situation that gives rise to a strong
inference of bias on any of the grounds set out in section
22.20.020,151 that party should move to disqualify for cause
immediately and assert their peremptory challenge within the time
limits established by court rule as well.  As the court of appeals has
noted, the underlying purpose of peremptory challenge rights in
allowing for a challenge when parties believe they will not obtain a
fair trial in front of a particular judge “strongly suggests that if
there are potential legal grounds for the judge’s disqualification,
146. McRae v. State, 909 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
147. See Weidner v. Superior Court, 715 P.2d 264, 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986);
Webber v. Webber, 706 P.2d 329, 330 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
148. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35.1(a).
149. See DeNardo v. Municipality of Anchorage, 938 P.2d 1099, 1100 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1997).
150. See Wamser v. State, 587 P.2d 232, 234 (Alaska 1978).
151. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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those grounds should be litigated before the party is called upon to
exercise a peremptory challenge.”152
V.  DISQUALIFICATION IN THE ALASKA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT
A. The Role of the Code
Although the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct is only directly
enforceable through judicial disciplinary proceedings conducted by
the Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct,153 it provides guidance
to judges in interpreting their ethical obligation to disqualify and
has been used by the courts to enhance interpretation of the
disqualification statute’s full meaning and intent.  The pre-1998
Code regarding judicial disqualification was broader and more
vague than the statute.154  The revised Code, effective in July 1998,
attempts to parallel the language of section 22.20.020 more
closely.155  Perhaps the most useful addition to the 1998 Code is the
expansion of the disclosure and waiver requirements that provide
procedural guidance to judges.156  The revised Code also includes
commentary that relates the requirements of section 22.20.020 to
the Code and illuminates many of the Code’s provisions.157
Courts have looked to the Code of Judicial Conduct in
interpreting “appearance of impropriety” or “appearance of bias”
issues.158  The earlier versions of the Code did not use mandatory
language, but instead referred to what a judge “should” do.159
Recognizing that less than mandatory language limits the
enforceability of the provision,160 the Alaska Supreme Court has
looked to the more mandatory language of the statute.161  So too,
where there is merely an appearance of partiality or bias (i.e., the
standards of the Code of Judicial Conduct), appellate courts have
required a greater showing than for actual bias (i.e., under the
152. DeNardo, 938 P.2d at 1100.
153. See ALASKA STAT. § 22.30.010 (LEXIS 1999).
154. ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C (1973).
155. ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E (LEXIS 1999).
156. See id. at Canon 3F.
157. See id. at Canons 3C-3F.
158. See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 822 P.2d 1333, 1343 (Alaska 1991);
Vaska v. State, 955 P.2d 943, 945 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
159. See Blake v. Gilbert, 702 P.2d 631, 641 (Alaska 1985).
160. The 1998 Code has altered this issue by using mandatory language in place
of the former “shoulds.”
161. See Blake, 702 P.2d at 641 (comparing the Alaska Code of Judicial
Conduct to the more stringent federal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)).
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statute) where the petitioner seeks to overturn a decision denying
disqualification.162
In Perotti v. State, the Alaska Court of Appeals explicitly
related the disqualification provisions under the Code of Judicial
Conduct to the language of section 22.30.020(a)(9), requiring
disqualification when “the judicial officer feels that, for any reason,
a fair and impartial decision cannot be given.”163  The court noted
that
the need to consider the appearance of impartiality seems
implicit in the language of AS 22.20.020(a)(9), for whenever it is
predictable that an unmistakable appearance of bias will arise
from a judge’s participation in a case, there will be “reason” for
concluding that “a fair and impartial decision cannot be
given.”164
Another distinguishing characteristic between the Code
requirements and the statute is that the Code governs a judge’s
duty to disqualify himself or herself, but the statute provides
procedures through which another judge can review that
disqualification decision.165  Apart from the use of the canons to
add meaning to the term “appearance of impartiality,” courts are
reluctant to use the Code’s differing standards to overturn a judge’s
determination of his or her ability to hear a case.166  In Vaska v.
State, the court of appeals looked to the Code of Judicial Conduct
to help determine whether actions by a judge’s law clerk could
affect the ability of the judge to continue to hear a matter.167  In
that case, an improper communication by the judge’s law clerk to
the state prosecutor’s office was viewed as potentially affecting the
entire judicial process.168  Looking not only to the Code provisions
governing disqualification, but also to a judge’s ethical obligation
to require his or her staff to observe the same standards that judges
must meet,169 the court concluded that
[b]ecause of the close working relationship between judges and
their law clerks, there comes a point where a law clerk’s bias for
or against a particular party or attorney, or a law clerk’s
potential interest in the outcome of particular litigation, rises to
162. See Feichtinger v. State, 779 P.2d 344 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
163. Perotti v. State, 806 P.2d 325, 327 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (quoting
ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.020(a)(9) (LEXIS 1999)).
164. Id.
165. See Wasserman v. Bartholomew, 923 P.2d 806, 815-16 (Alaska 1996)
(citing Feichtinger, 779 P.2d at 347 n.4).
166. See, e.g., Vaska v. State, 955 P.2d 943 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
167. See id. at 945.
168. See id. at 946.
169. See id.; see also ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(2) (1973)
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an intolerable level – a level where the judicial decisionmaking
process comes under reasonable suspicion.170
The court gave special attention to the role of the Code, noting that
judicial conduct codes “have long recognized the principle that it is
not enough for judicial officers to be untainted by bias; judicial
officers must, in addition, conduct themselves so as to avoid
engendering reasonable suspicions of bias.”171
B. Disclosure Requirements
While the statute governing judicial disqualification for cause
merely requires a judge to disclose a reason for disqualification
that relates to one of the itemized grounds, the Code of Judicial
Conduct expands both the duty to disclose and the way that any
waiver resulting from disclosure is to be handled.172  The
commentary to the 1998 Code notes that “[a] judge should disclose
on the record information that the judge believes the parties or
their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of
disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no real basis for
disqualification.”173  To ensure that any waiver of disqualification is
voluntary, the 1998 Code mandates the following:
The judge shall not participate in the parties’ discussions and
shall require the parties to hold their discussions outside the
presence of the judge.  The judge shall not comment in any
manner on the merits or advisability of waiver, other than to
explain the right of disqualification or to further elucidate the
ground or grounds of disqualification if requested by the
parties.174
Waiver by inaction is also allowable if the judge gives the parties “a
reasonable length of time to waive the disqualification, telling the
parties either (a) that their failure to act will be construed as a
decision to waive the potential disqualification or (b) that their
failure to act will be construed as a decision not to waive the
potential disqualification. . . .”175
Various advisory opinions issued by the Alaska Commission
on Judicial Conduct have also construed a judge’s obligation to
disclose very broadly.  Not limiting disclosure to those grounds
explicitly listed by the statute or the Code, the Commission’s
advisory opinions recommend disclosure in any instance that in an
170. Vaska, 955 P.2d at 945-46.
171. Id. at 945.
172. See ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 3E-F (1998).
173. Id. at Canon 3E(1) cmt.
174. Id. at Canon 3F(2).
175. Id. at Canon 3F(3).
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expansive way might be relevant to an appearance of impropriety.
These disclosures include contributions to charitable organizations
that may appear before the court,176 contributions to The Alaska
Legal Services Corporation in any case involving a legal services
attorney,177 and employment discussions with an entity involved in
litigation before the judge.178  Whether any of these disclosures also
should lead to recusal by the judge will depend on various factors
that affect the appearance of impropriety, including the issue in
dispute and the extent of the potential conflict created.  In other
words, a judge’s nominal financial contribution to a large charitable
organization that is in litigation before the judge on an
employment issue, for example, is not likely to create a reasonable
inference of bias.  In all instances, disclosure is favored in order to
avoid creating an appearance of impropriety, which is often created
where certain facts have been hidden, whether intentionally or
inadvertently, from the participants in the courtroom.
VI.  CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the various statutes, court rules, and ethics
provisions all have the same purpose:  to ensure a fair and impartial
decisionmaker.  Each approach places responsibility on a different
actor.  The peremptory challenge statute and rules place the
burden on the party to assert his or her “right” to disqualify the
judge.  The statute governing judicial disqualification for cause
places the responsibility evenly on the parties and the judge by
requiring the judge to act to disqualify himself or herself in certain
specified situations, yet placing the burden of moving to disqualify
the judge on the parties in all other cases.  Finally, the Code of
Judicial Conduct, as the ethics code for all state judicial officers,
places additional responsibilities exclusively on the judge to both
disclose and disqualify where required.
All of these doctrines also recognize that an overly lenient
approach to disqualification could lead to abuse.  It would be
unfair to allow parties to disqualify judges after sampling their
decisions in a matter or merely because a judge has seen the party
in court before on an unrelated matter.179  The public benefits not
only from impartial judges but also by an efficient, courageous, and
responsible judiciary.  Therefore, Alaska judges should be required
to hear cases that are difficult or uncomfortable.  Judicial
176. See Alaska Comm. on Judicial Conduct, Advisory Op. 97-2 (1997) (on file
with author).
177. See id. 98-4 (1998) (on file with author).
178. See id. 99-1 (1999) (on file with author).
179. See Pride v. Harris, 882 P.2d 381, 385 (Alaska 1994).
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disqualification law provides the framework for parties and judges
to exercise their rights and responsibilities to ensure fair
proceedings.  An understanding of the various statutes and rules
can lead to an understanding of each participant’s role in ensuring
the impartiality of Alaska’s courts.
